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PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE CHEMICAL




In the last decade, the principles of strict liability have been expanded to
encompass virtually every type of injury caused by a manufacturer's product.
Indeed, at least one state has effectively imposed absolute liability, under which
a manufacturer is liable for all harm caused by its product, regardless of
whether the injury was foreseeable at the time of manufacture.' When the
product is an identifiable object, such as an automobile or a household tool,
conduct-related defenses, such as misuse, voluntary assumption of the risk,
and contributory negligence, may apply. In the case of industrial chemicals,
however, additional considerations are important. Although they are not
"affirmative defenses," they may serve to excuse or qualify the duty to warn
of product hazards.
This lrticle will examine two issues that, for the most part, are unique to
chemical litigation. Each is derived from manufacturers' marketing procedures.
"Sophisticated user" considerations apply when the chemical is marketed
through knowledgeable intermediaries, or is sold directly to persons who are
aware of the dangers associated with product use. "Bulk seller" issues arise
in cases in which the product is sold en masse through distributors, who are
then responsible for separating the chemical into containers for individual
customers. In these instances, many courts have eliminated or qualified the
manufacturer's duty to warn, citing the severe practical burdens inherent in
identifying and communicating with remote users. Such limitations on the
* J.D., 1977, Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Houston, Texas-Ed.
1. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). As late
as summer, 1984, Beshada stood at the extreme of modem products liability, having moved
past the traditional standards of section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and followed
progressive theories proposed by Wade and Keeton. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabil-
ity for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973); Keeton, Products Liability and the Meaning of Defect,
5 ST. MARY's L.J. 30 (1973). Beshada's "absofute liability" was criticized, however, by both
judges and commentators, see, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288, 298-99 (N.H.
1983); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 189 N.J. Super. 424, 460 A.2d 203 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1983); Faulk, "Absolute Liability". Historical Perspectives and Political Alternatives, 37
OKLA. L. REV. 569 (1984); Powers, The Persistence of Fault in Strict Products Liability, 61
TEx. L. REv. 777 (1983), and has recently been "restricted to the facts which gave rise to its
holding." Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984). Significantly, Dean Wade
has now disassociated himself from Dean Keeton's theories, asserting his belief that post-
manufacturer liability should be judged by negligence standards, rather than by strict liability.
Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 734, 760-62 (1983).
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manufacturer's duty to warn are consistent with traditional strict liability goals
and foster industrial safety concerns.
The Sophisticated User
"Sophisticated user" considerations generally apply when a manufacturer
sells a chemical product to a distributor or a customer who either knows or
should know the dangers associated with chemical use. Since many chemical
suits involve employees of product customers, these considerations may prove
especially important in actions involving sophisticated employers. In these cases,
the employer's knowledge may significantly affect the manufacturer's duty
to warn.
The primary source of the "sophisticated user" issue is section 388 of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,' which provides:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or
to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused
by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person
for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely
to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel
is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its
dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous.
Comment n to this section elaborates on the relevance of purchaser sophisti-
cation:
There is necessarily some chance that information given to the third
person will not be communicated by him to those who are to use
the chattel. This chance varies with the circumstances existing at
the time the chattel is turned over to the third person, or permis-
sion is given to him to allow others to use it. These circumstances
include the known or knowable character of the third person and
may also include the purpose for which the chattel is given. Modern
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (emphasis added). This section generally
governs warning obligations under both strict liability and negligence. See, e.g., Manning v. Ashland
Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983); Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp.
407 (N.D. Okla. 1979); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (Ct. App. 1978).
But see Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1984). Such holdings are consis-
tent with decisions that recognize the relevance of blameworthy conduct in products liability
actions based on warning deficiencies. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See generally RESTATEMENT (SE-
COND) OF TORTS, § 402A, comment j (1965); Powers, supra note 1.
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life would be intolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a
certain extent on others doing what they normally do, particularly
if it is their duty to do so.3
Strictly speaking, this section does not set forth an "affirmative defense"
to liability. Rather, it defines the scope of a manufacturer's duty to warn
of product hazards. According to section 388 and its comments, the extent
of a manufacturer's duty to warn is variable, depending upon the purchaser's
expertise in product use. Thus cases involving sophisticated purchasers make
the plaintiff's burden of proof more stringent. In such actions, the plaintiff
must prove not only that the warning that reached him was inadequate but
also that the manufacturer had no reason to believe that its customer would
realize the dangers of the product. Viewed in this perspective, the plaintiff's
burden of proof is significantly increased.4
The relevance of purchaser sophistication was first developed in cases
involving prescription drugs. In those cases, physicians who distributed or
administered potentially harmful medicines were held to be "learned
intermediaries. ' 5 The drug manufacturer's duty to warn was limited to a
warning adequate to advise the physician of the risks associated with the drug;
once such a warning was given, the manufacturer was absolved of respon-
sibility to patients injured by the physician's neglect., Such cases recognized
that the manufacturer's duty to warn was not absolute; rather, it depended
on the foreseeable risk inherent in the marketing process." As a matter of
social policy, courts recognized that a manufacturer should be able to
reasonably rely on sophisticated purchasers to discharge their independent
duties to protect consumers.'
3. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 388, comment n, at 308 (1965) (emphasis added).
4. See Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1983).
5. See, e.g., Timm v. Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536, 538 (5th Cir. 1980). The phrase "informed
intermediary" has also been used. See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980).
6. See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (lst Cir. 1981); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm.
Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980); Timm v. Upjohn Co., 624 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1980); Givens
v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968);
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman,
180 Ind. App. 33, 388 N.E.2d 541 (1979); Hines v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 528 P.2d
1075 (1974); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 72 A.D.2d 59, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1979); McKee v. Moore,
648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982); McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974);
Leibowitz v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 224 Pa. Super. 418, 307 A.2d 449 (1973); Terhune v. A.H.
Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978).
7. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974) (mass marketer
of polio vaccine held responsible for polio contraction where marketing and inoculation procedures
did not necessarily involve physician's screening of individual patients). See generally Twerski,
Weinstein, Donoho & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design
Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495, 501 (1976); Merrill, Compensating
for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. Rv. 1 (1973).
8. See, e.g., McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24-25 (Okla. 1982), wherein the court stated:
It is the physician's duty to inform himself of the qualities and characteristics of
1985]
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The "learned intermediary" limitation was not restricted to medical con-
texts, however. Through section 388 of the Restatement, it encompassed
virtually the entire range of professional and industrial products, ranging from
professional hair care9 to industrial chemicals and instruments.II In these cases,
the courts generally limited the manufacturer's warning obligation to warn-
ings sufficient to apprise a sophisticated user of product dangers. Indeed, some
courts essentially held the manufacturer's failure to warn irrelevant when it
was shown that the purchaser was familiar with product dangers."
One of the earliest nonmedical considerations of user sophistication was
in Marker v. Universal Oil Products Co., 1 a decision construing Oklahoma
law. In Marker, a refinery employee was asphyxiated by carbon monoxide
gas. The widow sued the manufacturer of a catalytic polymerization unit in
which the decedent was working. She alleged that the manufacturer was liable
for failing to warn the decedent of the danger of entering the unit when hot
catalyst had been placed inside. At trial, the manufacturer established that
the decedent's employer was fully aware of the danger of asphyxiation. Based
on this evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for the manufacturer. On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that since the crea-
tion of the dangerous condition was equally within the technical knowledge
of both the manufacturer and the employer, the manufacturer had no duty
to warn the employer.' 3 The court further stated:
The duty to "exercise reasonable care" in supplying information
regarding the creation is placed upon the supplier by Section 388
[of the Restatement] and if he has done so, he is not subject to
liability, even though the information never reaches those for whose
use the chattel is supplied. Under the circumstances of this case,
it is beyond question that defendant [manufacturer] owed to
those products which he administers or prescribes for use of his patient, and to
exercise his judgment, based upon his knowledge of the patient as well as the pro-
duct .... Thus, if the product is properly labeled and carries the necessary instruc-
tions and warnings to fully apprise the physician of the proper procedures for use
and the dangers involved, the manufacturer may reasonably assume that the physi-
cian will exercise an informed judgment in the best interest of the patient.
(Emphasis added). See also Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978).
9. See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 913 (1968) (professional hair bleach).
10. See Brown v. Link Belt Div. of FMC Corp., 666 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1982) (crane on
offshore drilling platform); Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976) (barge
stripping operations); Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969)
(high-pressure cable tightening device); Parkinson v. California Co., 255 F.2d 265 (10th Cir.
1958) (propane gas storage); Marker v. Universal Oil Prod. Co., 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957)
(catalytic polymerization unit); Hopkins v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623 (3d
Cir. 1954) (blasting); Mayberry v. Akron Rubber Mach. Corp., 483 F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Okla.
1979) (rubber products sold for industrial use).
11. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969) (manufac-
turer of high-pressure cable-tightening device had no duty to warn purchaser of dangers already
known by purchaser's supervisory personnel).
12. 250 F.2d 603 (10th Cir. 1957).
13. Id. at 606 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 38:233
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Tidewater [the employer] no duty to instruct it as to fundamental
formulae and the possibility of danger in the misuse of the
polymerization unit and it had the right to rely on Tidewater to
protect its own employees from harm.'
4
Other federal circuits have followed Marker's rationale. For example, in Helene
Curtis Industries, Inc. v. Pruitt.'5 a layman purchased professional hair-
bleaching products from a beauty salon and applied them to plaintiff's hair
at her home. The products clearly stated that they were for "Professional
Use Only." As a result of the application, plaintiff's scalp was severely burned,
and she sued the manufacturer in strict liability. Although the trial court
rendered judgment in her favor, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded,
holding that the manufacturer could not be held responsible for injuries
resulting from nonprofessional use. In so ruling, the court stated that the
directions on the products had to be adequate only for a professional's use.' 6
Marker and Pruitt are consistent with the holdings of many other cases.
In Littlehale v. E. L duPont de Nemours & Co.,' 7 Judge Tenny stated:
[T]here is ordinarily no duty to give warning to members of a
profession against generally known risks. There need be no warn-
ing to one in a particular trade or profession against a danger
generally known to that trade or profession . . . . If no warning
is required to be given by the manufacturer to a purchaser who
is well aware of the inherent dangers of the product, there is no
duty on the part of the manufacturer to warn an employee of that
purchaser. 11
The Third,'9 the Fourth,2" the Sixth,2' the Seventh,22 and the Ninth23 circuits
have also accepted this reasoning, as well as several states.24
14. Id. at 607 (emphasis added).
15. 385 F.2d 841 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 913 (1968).
16. 385 F.2d at 858 (emphasis added).
17. 268 F. Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
18. 268 F. Supp. at 799 (emphasis added).
19. Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1976) (Pennsylvania law);
Bertone v. Turco Products, Inc., 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958) (New Jersey law); Hopkins v.
E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 212 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 872 (1954)
(Pennsylvania law). Cf. Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co., 729 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
"sophisticated user" considerations to be questions of fact under New Jersey law).
20. Marshall v. H.K. Ferguson Co., 623 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1980) (Virginia law).
21. Adams v. Union Carbide Corp., 737 F.2d 1453 (6th Cir. 1984) (Ohio law); Weekes v.
Michigan Chrome & Chem. Co., 352 F.2d 603 (6th Cir. 1965) (Michigan law).
22. Gonzalez v. Volvo of Am. Corp., 752 F.2d 295 (7th Cir. 1985) (Indiana law); McKay
v. Upson-Walton Co., 317 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1963) (Illinois law).
23. Jacobson v. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp., 409 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1969) (Montana law).
But cf. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (Montana law)
(holding that individual duty to warn may arise where product is used by employees outside
the supervision of technical personnel).
24. See Fierro v. International Harvester Co., 127 Cal. App. 3d 862, 179 Cal. Rptr. 923
(1982); May v. Allied Chlorine & Chem. Prod., Inc., 168 So. 2d 784 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964);
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1985
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Some decisions that recognize the relevance of "sophisticated user"
arguments characterize the issue as a question of fact. For example, in
Whitehead v. St. Joe Lead Co.,2 the Third Circuit held that employer
sophistication did not, under the record of the case, preclude manufacturer
liability as a matter of law. Since, under New Jersey law, knowledge of the
risk of an employer's failure to warn is imputed to the manufacturer, 2' the
court held that the "probable effect of any warning to a knowledgeable buyer
simply presents a question of fact concerning proximate causation for the
jury." 21 Although the court recognized that other states had decided the issue
as a matter of law, it concluded that New Jersey law, as well as the case
record, prohibited such a result.28 Significantly, however, the Whitehead court
did not hold user sophistication irrelevant in strict liability actions; rather,
it merely assigned it as a "factor" for the jury's consideration in causation.2 9
Cases that have rejected "sophisticated user" arguments have involved
marketing practices substantially different from those used in the chemical
industry. For example, in Siable v. Symons Corp.,3" the court held that a
manufacturer was not protected from strict liability by warning the plaintiff's
employer of support rod dangers. Nevertheless, the court recognized that a
different result might be appropriate in cases where the warning difficulties
were "immense."'" As an example, the court suggested that such a situation
might include cases "where toxic liquids are delivered in large quantities and
Jones v. Hittle Serv. Co., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196
So. 2d 598 (La. Ct. App. 1967); Fabbrini Family Foods, Inc. v. United Canning Corp., 90 Mich.
App. 80, 280 N.W.2d 877 (1979); Aim v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 687 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1985); Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 (1979).
25. 729 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1984).
26. See Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J. 386, 451 A.2d 179 (1982); Freund
v. Cellofilm Prop., Inc., 87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981).
27. Whitehead, 729 F.2d at 253 (quoting Michalko v. Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 91 N.J.
386, 402, 451 A.2d 179, 187 (1982)).
28. The court held that under New Jersey law, section 388 of the Restatement was inap-
plicable to strict liability actions:
Unlike Restatement (Second) Section 402A, Section 388 imposes liability on sup-
pliers for the negligent failure to warn foreseeable users of a product's dangerous
condition .... The only meaningful distinction between those sections, the [New
Jersey Supreme Court] has held, is that under Section 388, knowledge of a pro-
duct's dangerous propensities without a warning is not imputed to the manufacturer.
Whitehead, 729 F.2d at 249 (emphasis added). See also Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 98 N.J. 198, 485 A.2d 305 (1984). By this analysis, the Whitehead court diluted the preccdential
effect of cases from other jurisdictions, which had relied on section 388 for both strict liability
and negligence. Of course, despite New Jersey's professed allegiance to section 402A, recent
developments indicate actual reliance on the academic proposals of Wade and Keeton, rather
than the Restatement. See generally Faulk, supra note 1.
29. New Jersey has an extremely broad perspective regarding jury issues in product liability
actions, apparently allowing juries to find a "defect" merely upon a finding that a product's
risks outweigh its utilities. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
30. 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974).
31. Id. at 57.
238 [Vol. 38:233
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used by many persons in small quantities." ' 32 Other decisions imposing
manufacturer liability, such as Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp.,
33
are similarly distinguishable. In Borel there was no suggestion that the asbestos
insulation contractors knew or should have known of the dangers.34
It should be noted that "sophisticated user" considerations are not incon-
sistent with traditional strict liability justifications. According to these
rationales, manufacturers are in a better position to bear the costs of injury
by reflecting the losses in product costs. Supposedly, such manufacturers can
insure against liability and incorporate premium costs in the price of the
product.3" In a "sophisticated user" context, however, the user is commonly
a manufacturer itself, or a specialized service organization. To the extent the
user is a manufacturer, it can incorporate costs just as easily as the original
producer. The same can be said of special service businesses, such as painters
or sandblasters. Injuries sustained during the course of the user's activities
are legitimate costs of business operations. To allow injured parties to reach
the original producer in such situations allows intermediaries to evade losses
for which they may be directly responsible without yielding corresponding
public benefits.
According to another traditional justification, imposition of strict liability
provides manufacturers with incentive to research and eliminate hazards. 6
Despite this admirable goal, the best warnings are wholly ineffective when
32. Id.
33. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
34. The Fifth Circuit has expressly recognized this disctinction. See Martinez v. Dixie Carriers,
Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 466 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974) (sophisticated user considerations inapplicable in painting trade, where
use is not typically supervised by technical personnel and product is marketed in manner where
warnings can easily be given).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment c (1965):
On whatever theory, the justification for the strict liability has been said to be
that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and does expect, in
the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to rely upon the
seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consump-
tion be placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production
against which liability insurance can be obtained; and that the consumer of such
products is entitled to the maximum of protection at the hands of someone, and
the proper persons to afford it are those who market the products.
The cases have generally accepted this justification without reexamination. See, e.g., Sindell v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144 (1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1981); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d
539, 547 (1982). Recent commentators, however, have criticized its inflexibility. See, e.g., Powers,
supra note 1, at 812-13; Faulk, supra note 1, at 576-77; Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case
Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 853, 877-79 (1983); Henderson,
Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CALi. L. REv. 919, 942-44 (1981).
36. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539, 547 (1982);
First Nat'l Bank v. Nor-Am Agric. Prod., Inc., 88 N.M. 74, 537 P.2d 682, 695 (1975); Phillips
1985]
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they are not communicated to customers and employees. Considering the
relative opportunities of the manufacturer and the user to communicate
warnings, the user is clearly in a better position to prevent injuries. Although
it may be nearly impossible for a manufacturer to individually warn each
person who might be expected to work with its product, the sophisticated
employer or distributor is in an ideal position to discharge this burden. Thus,
to the extent that accident prevention is a goal of strict liability, that goal
is best served by casting responsibility on the party most able to ensure its
success-the sophisticated intermediary.
As can be gleaned from the foregoing discussion, neither economic nor
personal welfare is promoted by ignoring user sophistication as a factor in
strict liability. In conformity with this conclusion, the courts have generally
excused a manufacturer from liability if its customer either knew, or in the
exercise of ordinary prudence, should have known of product dangers.
Legislative product liability initiatives have also recognized this principle."
This reasoning is particularly appropriate in actions involving toxic chemicals,
since, as a general rule, such chemicals are marketed through a network of
sophisticated distributors who, in turn, sell to knowledgeable industrial con-
sumers. In such cases, the plaintiff's burden of proof increases as he climbs
the marketing ladder, and each successive step depends on the degree and
accuracy of communication between the marketing parties. This result is con-
sistent with the commercial realities of the chemical marketplace, and it pro-
motes industrial safety.
The Bulk Seller
Under present marketing practices, many chemical manufacturers sell
substances in large quantities to distributors, who then repackage chemicals
v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 499, 525 P.2d 1033, 1041-42 (1974). Abstract allegiance
to this justification has also been questioned. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 1; Faulk, supra note
1; Page, supra note 35, at 880-81; Henderson, supra note 35, at 952-53; Schwartz, The Post
Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 892, 904 (1983).
37. See S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Section 6(d) of this proposed federal "Product
Liability Act" provides:
Where warnings or instructions are required under subsection (b) or (c), such warnings
and instructions shall be given to the product user, unless:
(1) in light of the practical and economic difficulties of giving the warnings or
instructions directly to the product user, the likelihood that the product would cause
harm of the type alleged by the claimant, and the probable seriousness of that
harm, a reasonably prudent person would have given such warnings or instructions
to a third person, including an employer, who could be expected to take action
to avoid the product user's harm or to assure that the risk of harm is explained
to the product user; or
(2) the product is one which may be legally used only by or under the supervision
of a using or supervising expert, in which case the manufacturer shall act with
reasonable prudence to warn or instruct the expert.
See also UNIF. PRODUCT LmAiry AcT, § 104(c)(5), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1980).
240 [Vol. 38:233
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into smaller containers for sale. When generic chemicals are involved, such
as acetone, benzene, methyl ethyl ketone, toluene, or xylene, the distributor
may commingle the products of various manufacturers in common storage
tanks, thus precluding identification of any particular manufacturer's product.
Although the various manufacturers may furnish labels to the distributor, the
presence of a particular manufacturer's label on a barrel does not necessarily
mean that any of its product is inside. After considering these procedures,
many courts have restricted the duties of "bulk seller" manufacturers. Under
these holdings, the manufacturer's duty to warn may extend only to its
distributor and need only be adequate to apprise an industrial user of the
danger.
Like sophisticated user considerations, bulk seller principles are not actually
matters of affirmative defense. Rather, they simply describe the scope of the
manufacturer's duties and define the plaintiff's burden of proof. This was
illustrated in Morris v. Shell Oil Co.3 In Morris the plaintiff developed
dermatitis after using a solvent originally manufactured by Shell. The solvent
was sold through a distributor, who purchased it in bulk by tank-car from
Shell. The distributor separated the chemical into separate five-gallon drums
for distribution. Although the plaintiff established that the distributor did
not warn its customers of the solvent's dangers, the record was silent regard-
ing whether Shell had warned its distributor. In reviewing the matter, the Mor-
ris court acknowledged that Shell, as a bulk supplier, had a duty to warn
its distributor of the dangers, but that the plaintiff had the burden of proving
that no warning had been given. Since the plaintiff failed to adduce evidence
that Shell failed to warn, she failed to sustain her burden of proof and could
not recover? 9
The Morris case illustrates the importance of recognizing that bulk seller
considerations affect the plaintiff's burden of proof, rather than provide an
affirmative defense. If viewed as an affirmative defense, the bulk seller prin-
ciple would require a manufacturer to prove the validity of its marketing prac-
tices, as well as the fact that an adequate warning was communicated. Such
requirements are wholly improper and place the defendant at a severe tactical
disadvantage. It is not the defendant who must prove his warnings adequate;
rather, the plaintiff must show that under the practices existing in the
marketplace, the manufacturer's warning to its distributor was inadequate to
apprise it of product risks. Properly considered, bulk seller considerations
are not purely defensive; they are a part of the factual environment of the
plaintiff's case and define the duty that must have been breached to allow
recovery. Such arguments are not merely semantical; as seen in Moore, pro-
per placement of the burden of proof may be dispositive.
With this perspective established, it is appropriate to consider the extent
to which the courts have abrogated or qualified a bulk seller's duty to warn.
One of the most recent decisions regarding this issue is Groll v. Shell Oil
38. 467 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1971).
39. Id.
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Co." In Groll the plaintiff was burned when he used lighter fluid to ignite
logs in his fireplace. The fluid was manufactured by Shell and was sold in
bulk to a distributor. The distributor then placed the fluid into labeled con-
tainers for sale. In affirming a judgment for Shell, the appellate court held
that if the manufacturer adequately warns its distributor of product hazards,
the manufacturer is absolved from responsibility at the time of the bulk sale. 4
In support of its ruling, the court noted that to hold otherwise would impose
an onerous burden on the bulk sales manufacturer "to inspect the labeling
of repackaged products, and to enforce the distribution of warnings by its
distributors. '4 2 The reasoning of the Groll court is consistent with various
other decisions holding that, as a matter of law, a bulk seller has no duty
to warn the customers of an adequately informed vendee.
43
In other jurisdictions, the courts have adopted a broader perspective. Viewing
the Restatement broadly, these courts have held that communicating product
information to a distributor does not necessarily discharge the bulk seller from
liability. According to these decisions, the bulk seller's duty is controlled by
a variety of factors, such as the extent of the manufacturer's contact with
ultimate users, the relative burden of enforcing distributor warnings, the
reliability of the distributor, and the danger presented by the product."
Despite this relatively broad perspective, no court has yet ruled that a bulk
seller has an absolute, nondelegable duty to warn ultimate users. The absence
of such holdings seems to indicate judicial recognition of marketplace reality
and a desire toward allocating risks to parties best able to prevent the harm.
Such a trend is strongly suggested by the dilution of common law distinctions
between defenses to strict liability and negligence. A growing number of
jurisdictions now recognize contributory negligence as a defense to strict
products liability and have incorporated strict liability into comparative causa-
tion systems. 45 Currently pending federal product liability legislation also
40. 148 Cal. App. 3d 444, 196 Cal. Rptr. 52 (1983).
41. Id. at 450, 196 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
42. Id.
43. See Berg v. Underwood's Hair Adaption Process, Inc., 751 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1984);
Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1983); Parkinson v. California Co., 255
F.2d 265 (10th Cir. 1958); Shell Oil Co. v. Harrison, 425 So. 2d 67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Zunck v. Gulf Oil Corp., 224 So. 2d 386 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Jones v. Hittle Serv.,
Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 549 P.2d 1383 (1976); Younger v. Dow Corning Corp., 202 Kan. 674, 451
P.2d 177 (1969); Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 279 Minn. 336, 156 N.W.2d 898 (1968);
Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 (1979).
44. See Bryant v. Technical Res. Co., 654 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981); Suchomajcz v. Hummel
Chem. Co., 524 F.2d 19 (3d Cir. 1975); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d
271 (Ct. App. 1978); Pepper v. Selig Chem. Indus., 161 Ga. App. 548, 288 S.E.2d 693 (1982).
These authorities, however, generally reflect the facts under review and do not reject the tradi-
tional rule that, on a proper record, issues of "foreseeability" and "knowledge" may be decided
as a matter of law. See, e.g., Manning v. Ashland Oil Co., 721 F.2d 192, 196 (7th Cir. 1983).
45. See Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1979) (Virgin Islands); Pan-Alaska
Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1979) (federal admiralty
jurisdiction); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (Mississippi law);
Trust Corp. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D. Mont. 1981); Stueve v. American
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proposes apportionment according to percentage of responsibility. 6 Specifical-
ly, the legislation absolves manufacturers from liability if the immediate vendee
is adequately informed and further communications with the actual claimant
were not feasible.
47
These decisions and proposals recognize that public policy does not
necessarily coincide with manufacturer liability, particularly when the
marketplace provides other parties with greater opportunities to prevent the
loss. As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated in Duncan v. Cessna Air-
craft Co.4: "The failure to allocate accident costs in proportion to the par-
ties' relative abilities to prevent or reduce those costs is economically ineffi-
cient. . . .An ideal tort system should impose responsibility on the parties
according to their abilities to prevent the harm." '49
Such reasoning properly reconciles the goals of particular plaintiffs and the
public at large. As developed earlier, strict liability traditionally has been based
upon economic and safety considerations. According to those justifications,
strict manufacturer liability imposes responsibility on the party best able to
bear the loss and provides an incentive for production of safer products.5
In generic chemical cases, however, these traditional justifications are extremely
Honda Motors Co., 457 F. Supp. 740 (D. Kan. 1978); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. AVCO Lycoming
Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Butand v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc.,
555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441,
146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Kaneko v.
Hilo Coast Processing, 65 Hawaii 447, 654 P.2d 343 (1982); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 4 Kan.
App. 2d 545, 608 P.2d 1379 (1980); Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast Div., 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Sandford v.
Chevrolet Div. of Gen. Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624 (1982); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984); Star Furn. Co. v. Pulaski Furn. Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.
Va. 1982); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Cf. Scott v. Rizzo, 96
N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981) (remarking favorably of loss allocation in strict liability actions,
without ruling on the issue).
46. S. 100, supra note 37, § 9(c) provides for assignment of responsibility to the plaintiff
upon a finding of "misuse." Significantly, section 9(c) broadly defines "misuse" to encompass
most aspects of contributory negligence, as well as a distributor's failure to instruct its customers
in safe product use:
Misuse shall be considered to occur when a product is used for a purpose or in
a manner which is not consistent with the reasonably anticipated conduct of users,
which may include use for a purpose or in a manner which is not consistent with
adequate warnings or instructions available to the user or failure of a person who
would reasonably be expected to train another person or otherwise provide for
the safe use of the product and who does not train or provide for the safe use
of the product.
Upon such a finding, comparative responsibility would be invoked under section 9. See also
UNF. PRODUCT L1Ajlu=Y ACT, §§ 111, 112(c), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1980).
47. See S. 100, supra note 37, § 6(d). See also UNEF. PRODUCT LiABiriTY ACT, § 104(c)(5),
44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1980).
48. 665 S.W.2d 414 (rex. 1984).
49. Id. at 218-19 (emphasis added)..
50. See Siable v. Symons Corp., 221 N.W.2d 50 (N.D. 1974).
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short-sighted. When a bulk seller is held ultimately liable despite its inability
to enforce warning communications by its distributor, the practical effect is
merely a more expensive product without any meaningful assurance of im-
proved public safety. While this may accommodate the interests of particular
plaintiffs in obtaining compensation, it actually frustrates the greater public
interest in prevention. If preventing future injury is a paramount considera-
tion in allocating losses in product liability litigation, then damages should
not be arbitrarily assigned; rather, damages should be apportioned according
to each party's relative opportunity and ability to prevent injuries. Such ap-
portionment accommodates compensation needs while simultaneously providing
the maximum incentive to reduce future losses.
Conclusion
The issues examined in this article present new challenges to the traditional
justifications for strict manufacturer liability. Unlike most products, generic
chemicals are marketed to sophisticated industrial distributors and users. These
customers generally are fully aware of product dangers and have a greater
opportunity to prevent injuries than a remote manufacturer. In circumstances
involving bulk sales, the manufacturer's connection becomes even more
attenuated. Since distributor storage, barrelling, and sales are beyond the scope
of a manufacturer's control, an adequate warning to the distributor may
discharge manufacturer liability.
Contrary to current perceptions, these considerations are not matters of
affirmative defense; rather, they merely define the scope of a manufacturer's
duty to warn. The plaintiff retains the burden of proving that the manufac-
turer has breached its duty. In order to hold the manufacturer liable, he must
prove that the manufacturer had no reason to believe that its distributor or
users were aware of product hazards. This burden recognizes communication
limitations inherent in the marketing process and places liability upon the
parties best able to prevent future injuries.
As a matter of social policy, such a result serves the public interest. If,
as most jurisdictions now recognize, strict liability is necessary to facilitate
the compensation of parties injured by dangerous products, such liability
should not be indiscriminately imposed. Rather, liability should be allocated
to encourage overall industrial safety and to ensure the diligence of all involved
parties in working toward that goal. Given the dangers associated with in-
dustrial chemicals, such allocation is not only reasonable but a public necessity.
[Vol. 38:233
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol38/iss2/4
